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First, the Court, as I have noted, went out of its way-way out of its way-to criticize
the effects test. The effects test had nothing to do with the Australian plaintiffs' claims, but
Justice Scalia knew-in fact, he cites the relevant cases, just as he cited them in his dissent
in Hartford Fire17-that it was the effects test that had obliterated the presumption against
extraterritoriality in antitrust. The Court was trying to make sure that what happened there
was not going to happen again.
Second, the specific holding reached by the Court-that the focus of the statute is on
"domestic transactions' -is not consistent with the effects test. Under the pre-Morrison
effects test, it was widely assumed, to the point where defendants would not even argue
otherwise, that Americans who purchased shares on foreign exchanges could sue under the
securities laws, because they suffer the effects of the fraud at home. 18 But under Morrison,
as Justice Stevens disapprovingly pointed out in his concurring opinion, those Americans
can no longer sue. 19 And district judges are all reading Morrison the same way. 20 The effects
test is dead.
Third, Morrison's "focus" analysis cannot be construed to restrict the scope of what is
considered to be extraterritorial under the presumption. To the contrary, the "focus" analysis
was about restricting what can be considered domestic: it was an effort to demonstrate why
particular domestic conduct was not enough to cause extraterritoriality's watchdog to lose
its bite; it was not an attempt to define what would always suffice. Morrison should thus
be understood to mean that having domestic conduct that coincides with the domestic "focus"
of congressional concern is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for avoiding
the presumption.21
Finally, the Court's holding was quintessentially territorialist. The Court held that "the
focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon
purchases and sales of securities in the United States." 22 Someone once proposed rather
similar choice-of-law rules to govern common-law fraud-"When a person sustains loss by
fraud, the place of wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent misrepresentations are made"-and for torts generally: "The place of the wrong is the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." These rules are
from Section 377 of the First Restatement of Conflicts. 23 Professor Beale, I suspect, would
have unreservedly applauded Morrison.
THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AFTER MORRISON

By William S. Dodge*
The Supreme Court's recent extraterritoriality jurisprudence has been a mess.' The Court
has applied a presumption against extraterritoriality but has seemed to do so inconsistently.
17See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 3886 n.11; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
18See, e.g., In re Rhodia S.A. Sec. Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
1 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
20
See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (RJH), 2011 WL 590915, at *10--*11
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing cases).
21Cf Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, No. 10 Civ. 0532 (HB), 2010 WL 5463846, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 2010) (holding that, under Morrison, federal law does not apply to derivatives contracts referencing foreign
stock even if the contracts are made in the United States).
22Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
23 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 377

& note 4, at 457 (1934).
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The presumption has limited the reach of the federal eight-hours law, 2 but not the federal
trademark statute;3 it has constrained antidiscrimination law,4 but not antitrust law. 5
Justice Scalia's opinion in Morrison tries to bring order to the chaos. Morrison reiterates
"that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 6 It emphasizes that this principle applies
"in all cases." 7 And it clarifies what is necessary to overcome the presumption-not a
"clear statement" but, taking context into account, a "clear indication of extraterritoriality."
Less obviously but most importantly, Morrison changes the presumption by focusing not on
the location of the prohibited conduct, but on the location of its effects.9
The traditional understanding of the presumption against extraterritoriality focused on
"where the act is done." 10 The Morrison plaintiffs argued that because the alleged fraud
happened in Florida, the presumption did not apply, but Justice Scalia disagreed. Courts
applying the presumption should concentrate not on where the acts were done, he reasoned,
but rather on "the 'focus' of congressional concern."" "[W]e think that the focus of the
Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and
sales of securities in the United States." 1 2 What mattered was not where the conduct occurred
but where its effects were felt.
To be sure, Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit's "effects test" along with its
"conduct test."' 3 But the Second Circuit's effects test was broader than Morrison's. For
example, it applied the Exchange Act to transactions on a foreign exchange that affected the
price of U.S.-listed shares in the same company 1 4 and counted as "effects" the sending of
misstatements into the United States.15 It was this broad effects test Justice Scalia condemned
as "vague," "unpredictable," and "not easy to administer." 1 6 In its place, Morrison substituted a narrower effects test that focuses exclusively on the location of the specific transaction
affected by the fraud.' 7
Shifting the presumption to focus on effects is a positive development. First, it is consistent
with the presumption's modem justification-that Congress "is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions."' 8 Concern with domestic conditions usually means concern with
' See generally William S. Dodge, Loose Canons: InternationalLaw and Statutory Interpretationin the TwentyFirst Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 547 (David L.

Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
2 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
4 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
6
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2881.
Id. at 2883.
9 See William S. Dodge, Morrison's Effects Test, 40 Sw. L. REv.687 (2011).
1oAm. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
" Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255).
121Id.
"See id. at 2878-81.
14See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (2d Cir. 1968).
15See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1989).
'6 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
17 Id. at 2886.
" Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248). For a critique of other justifications, see
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 11223 (1998).
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domestic effects.19 Second, it makes sense of the Supreme Court's seemingly inconsistent
extraterritoriality case law. Cases in which the Court has applied the presumption to limit
the reach of a statute have not involved effects in the United States. 20 Cases in which the
Court has held federal statutes to apply extraterritorially have. 21 Tying the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law to effects in the United States is not just good policy; it is what the
Supreme Court has in fact been doing for the past hundred years.
What are Morrison'simplications for other statutes? Applying Morrison,the Second Circuit
held in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc. that the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not apply extraterritorially, but the court did not
examine the "focus" of the statute. 22 The district court in European Community v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc. did perform such an analysis, concluding that "[b]ecause the 'focus' of RICO
is the 'enterprise,' a RICO 'enterprise' must be a 'domestic enterprise."' 23 Thus, as another
district court held, RICO should not apply to racketeering activity in the United States where
"the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign." 24
Conversely, under Morrison, RICO should apply to racketeering activity abroad that causes
effects in the United States on or through a domestic enterprise. Thus, the district court in
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. got it wrong when it released British American
Tobacco (BATCo) from its final order on the ground that RICO did not apply after Morrison.25
The court had earlier found that defendants established a RICO enterprise in the United
States 26 and that "BATCo's activities and statements furthered the Enterprise's overall
scheme to defraud, which had a tremendous impact on the United States." 27 Those findings
are sufficient to establish RICO liability irrespective of where the predicate acts occurred.
Finally, what about the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)? 28 The "focus" of the ATS was to
provide redress for violations of the law of nations, 29 and at least one such violationpiracy-would typically have occurred on the high seas, outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. A 1795 Attorney General's opinion confirms this understanding. Asked
what actions might be taken against Americans who had violated the law of nations on
neutrality by helping the French attack a British outpost in Sierra Leone, Attorney General
Bradford expressed "no doubt" that injured aliens could bring a civil suit under the ATS. 30
This should be a sufficiently "clear indication" of Congress's intent to apply the ATS
19Indeed, in the antitrust context, Congress has expressly permitted anticompetitive conduct in the United States
if its harmful effects are felt exclusively abroad. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6a & 45a(3).
20
See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). Effects on Americans abroad are not effects
in the United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 402

cmt. g (1987) (distinguishing

passive personality principle).
21See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280 (1952). Morrison expressly distinguished both the antitrust and Lanham Act cases. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2887 n.11.
22 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
232011 WL 843957 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8).
2 Cedefio v. Intech Group Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Cedeiio, Norex, and European
Community were all properly dismissed for this reason.
25 783 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2011).
26 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp.2d 1, 867-72 (D.D.C. 2006).
27
Id. at 873.
28 For a pre-Morrisondiscussion of the question, see William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive
JurisdictionFallacy, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 35 (2010).

29 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
30 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
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extraterritorially, and it is worth noting that the Bush administration raised the presumption
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and got not a single vote for its argument.3 '
At a more fundamental level, there is an important distinction between the ATS and the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act: the ATS is simply a jurisdictional provision,
whereas Section 10(b) is a rule of substantive law. It is true that the Supreme Court has
applied the presumption to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Federal Tort
Claims Act,32 but these acts codify federal rules of sovereign immunity in addition to granting
jurisdiction. The ATS, by contrast, is "strictly jurisdictional." 33 This distinction can be found
in Morrison itself. Justice Scalia applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, a substantive provision prohibiting fraud.34 He did not apply the
presumption to Section 27, the jurisdictional provision for Exchange Act violations, even
though it contained no clear indication that it applied extraterritorially at the time. 36 Rather,
Justice Scalia emphasized that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction under
Section 27. The most plausible reason for the Court's differing treatment of Section 10(b)
and Section 27 is that the presumption applies only to substantive statutes and not to
jurisdictional ones.
Morrison is the Supreme Court's most important extraterritoriality decision in almost two
decades, but understanding it requires care. Morrison shifts the focus of the presumption
from the location of the conduct to the location of the effects. This means that RICO should
not apply to conduct in the United States that causes effects abroad on or through a foreign
enterprise, but should apply to conduct abroad that causes effects in the United States on or
through a domestic enterprise. But Morrison does not mean that the presumption applies to
jurisdictional statutes like the ATS.
MORRISON, THE EFFECTS TEST, AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORIALITY:

A

REPLY TO PROFESSOR DODGE

By Austen L. Parrish*
Last term, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court decided
what may be the most significant legislative jurisdiction case of the last few decades. In
putting an end to so-called "foreign-cubed" securities cases, the Supreme Court strongly
reaffirmed the presumption against extraterritoriality. Specifically, the Court held that insufficient evidence existed that Congress intended Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and
Exchange Act to "provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges."]
31See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46-50, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 182581.
32See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197 (1993).
" 542 U.S. 692,713 (2004); see also id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing ATS as "purely jurisdictional").
If the presumption applies to the ATS, it would presumably apply equally to the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, and to the grant of subject matter jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United States."
18 U.S.C. § 3231. This would be contrary to common practice.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
36It has since been amended by § 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
17Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
*Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Southwestern Law School.
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875, 2883, 2888 (2010).

